What information did we obtain from this interview?

Khodorkovsky was the owner of the “Kolos” enterprise, which produced rations for the Russian Armed Forces. These supplies were not paid for; he provided them for free to support the Russian army in Chechnya. Khodorkovsky supplied half of the entire Russian army with fuel and lubricants during the war in Chechnya. Khodorkovsky armed the Tomsk OMON (special police unit) for the war in Chechnya. He admitted to arranging weapon supplies for the Tomsk OMON through the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ special equipment institute, which he paid for. He also confessed to pushing this decision through his company’s board of directors.

As the owner of the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant, Khodorkovsky supplied Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) to the Russian army in Chechnya. He recommended to President Yeltsin and Defense Minister Grachev new modified IFVs for better performance in Chechnya, but Yeltsin and Grachev dismissed his innovations and requested older models.

Through his interview, Khodorkovsky acknowledged his complicity in the crimes committed in Chechnya. Astonishingly, he does not realize that he has given a confession with no statute of limitations for the Chechen people. He feels no moral responsibility and shows no hint of seeking forgiveness from the Chechen people for his complicity in these crimes. In his moral compass, this is impossible because his values were formed in the wild jungles of 1990s Russian capitalism, where might makes right.

When Khodorkovsky justifies the Russian military invasion of Chechnya, he tries to manipulate the narrative by contrasting the Chechen war with the war in Ukraine. But this is a ruse, which falls apart upon comparative analysis.

1. Justification of military invasion:

Chechnya:

– Propaganda portrayed Chechen militants as terrorists and extremists threatening Russia’s security. Russian intervention was presented as necessary to protect the civilian population from terrorist threats.

Ukraine:

– Russian media depicted Ukrainian military and nationalists as fascists and neo-Nazis threatening the Russian-speaking population. Operations in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea were framed as protecting Russian-speaking citizens from alleged Ukrainian aggression.

2. External threat and national mobilization:

Chechnya:

– Propaganda claimed that Chechen militants were supported by international terrorists and foreign mercenaries, creating an image of an external threat and mobilizing public opinion to support the war.

Ukraine:

– Russian media actively promoted the idea that the conflict in Ukraine was instigated by the West, primarily the USA and NATO, to weaken Russia. This fueled patriotic sentiments within the country.

3. Humanitarian and human rights justifications:

Chechnya:

– The war was justified by the need to restore order and protect civilians from terrorists, creating the illusion of a humanitarian mission.

Ukraine:

– The annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbas were justified as protecting the rights of Russian-speaking citizens from persecution and violence, also presented as a humanitarian mission.

Thus, Khodorkovsky uses the same tactics as Russian propaganda to justify his actions in Chechnya, but these justifications are no different from those used for the war in Ukraine. This is manipulation aimed at hiding the true nature of his actions and diverting attention from his responsibility for complicity in crimes.

When discussing the fate of the nation, the state, democracy, contacts with the KGB, and morality in a lengthy three-hour interview, it is essentially enough to listen to Khodorkovsky’s answer to the journalist’s question: “Did you know that the weapons you provided to the Russian soldiers were used to commit crimes in Chechnya?” Khodorkovsky responds: “They are ours“. This reflects the same approach to justice as Putin’s: if someone is one of ours, they are right, they can commit crimes, and they should be helped. Justifying his position, he says that he was raised on the streets of Moscow’s “Mazutka” district, where there were its own concepts of “ours” and “others“. This is undoubtedly an unconscious reference to Putin’s interview, where he said: “The Leningrad street taught me one rule: if a fight is inevitable, strike first“. This is the culmination not only of Khodorkovsky’s morality, who claims the role of leader of the Russian opposition, but also of the overwhelming majority of the so-called Russian opposition, which dreams of sitting on Putin’s throne. Having lived for many years in democratic Western European countries, he has been unable to free himself from imperial thinking and the desire to maintain Russia as a prison of nations. Although he was released from prison over a decade ago, the prison mentality, unfortunately, has not left him.

The real, non-illusory, non-staged Russian opposition is emerging today in Ukraine on the battlefield, with weapons in hand. These are the people who have a chance to gain political subjectivity, while all others have no chance at all. It is hard to imagine even a single hypothetical scenario in which Khodorkovsky could have a political future inside Russia. Most likely, his political consultants also see no prospects, but as long as he has money, they will remain the entourage of the naked king.